Challenger: A True Story of Heroism and Disaster on the Edge of Space

One member of the Commission, 67-year-old Dr. Richard Feynman, was a Caltech professor and Nobel Prize winner in physics whose expertise was quantum physics. Before the hearings began, he flew to NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena to receive a briefing on how the shuttle operated. He immediately picked up on the susceptibility of the O-rings to damage. Once the hearings began, he was quickly frustrated by the slow pace of the testimony. He took it upon himself to demonstrate, using a small O-ring and a glass of ice water, how the cold quickly caused the O-ring to lose its elasticity. His demonstration was televised.

The next day, the executives from Thiokol who had been on the teleconference the night before the launch were scheduled to testify. At the hearing the next day, Chair Rogers placed pressure on Thiokol to reveal everything that could eventually come to light. The executives admitted that they reversed their warning not to launch during the teleconference. However, they insisted that they had not done so out of pressure from NASA. Engineers Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson maintained their opposition to launching. Nevertheless, by the time the Thiokol testimony ended, it was clear to the Commission that the executives had felt pressure to comply with NASA’s desire to launch, so as to not risk losing its contract with them. In the days that followed, Jesse Moore, the associate administrator for spaceflight, and NASA Administrator James Beggs both resigned.

Meanwhile, the debris from the wreckage was being collected and examined. Recovery and analysis were supervised by Bob Crippen and were careful and methodical. NASA continued to insist publicly that no remains of the crew would be recovered, certain that they would have instantly been consumed by fire and turned to ash.

As the Commission continued, its members traveled to individual sites to gather information themselves, rather than relying on NASA to present information to them. As February ended, Rogers prepared to televise three days of hearings. He was frank that he intended to make “a public scapegoat out of Larry Mulloy and Thiokol management” (407). This proved true, as the Commission stringently interrogated the decision to launch despite the inconclusive data on the O-rings. They were adamant that inconclusive data was a solid reason to cancel the launch. By the end of the hearing, it became clear that the Challenger explosion was not a technical failure but a mismanagement by humans.

In March, the debris of the Challenger’s cabin and the remains of the astronauts were located and recovered. It became apparent that the astronauts had not been killed by the explosion but more likely by the force of the impact of crashing into the ocean upon the shuttle’s deceleration. For some family members, the recovery of remains brought relief, but it frustrated others who had already accepted the notion that the astronauts were killed instantaneously and had therefore experienced no horror or pain.

Meanwhile, internal dissent developed in NASA as astronauts learned just how dangerous the O-rings were: None of them had ever been informed of the past damage and were outraged that NASA did not feel that they should have been told. Some astronauts went rogue and voiced this outrage to the press, even while NASA executives were still insisting that it was not absolutely certain that the O-rings were the cause of the explosion.

Debris was finally brought up from the ocean floor in mid-March. The cockpit’s instrument panel, five computers that controlled the shuttle in flight, and six machines that recorded what had happened inside the orbiter were also collected. The Commission continued its rigorous investigation. Members were divided into four separate teams and assigned a specific aspect within NASA or Thiokol to investigate. 

Dr. Feynman, however, had made up his mind that the mismanagement that caused the rush to launch was likely impacting other areas of NASA. He was determined to examine the shuttle engines—a known problem area. He quickly concluded that the same risks were being taken with the engines: Engineers pointed out malfunctions, but managers and executives continued to hope for the best.

In early April, journalists and photographers viewed pieces of the wreckage for the first time, in turn making the public aware of the true extent of the damage. The remains proved that the orbiter had not been set afire in the sky but instead had plummeted intact into the ocean, destroyed by the force of impact.

On April 13, a portion of the item that NASA sought most—the right-side rocket booster—was recovered. It was clearly damaged with a large hole, as if a blowtorch had been applied to it. At the same time, the remains of the astronauts were being identified and autopsies performed. At the end of the month, the remains were released to the families.

The Commission delivered its final report to President Reagan in June that year. It detailed the history of the shuttle program and the cost-saving measures employed in the rocket boosters, as well as the known problems with the joint seal. The report criticized Thiokol for its knowledge of the O-ring damage and for its lack of urgency in finding a solution to the joint seal problem. It criticized the Marshall Space Flight managers most harshly of all, arguing that Larry Mulloy had failed for years to alert his superiors about failings in the O-rings and the concerns that Thiokol had voiced to him about their performance in cold temperatures. The report argued, too, that NASA had overall become increasingly lax about risk.

Several dismissals and reassignments within NASA resulted. Some members of Congress were angered that no criminal charges were brought, but Rogers—a former prosecutor—insisted that there was no evidence to prove that the negligence was willful. Family members of the astronauts varied in their response to the report; some prepared to seek legal action for damages.

At the same time, pathologists resigned themselves to being unable to determine the exact cause of death of the seven crew members. The wreckage, however, revealed that three of the crew members had put on emergency air packs that were to be used to aid breathing during an escape from the craft. Similarly, the tapes recovered were repaired, and the sound of pilot Mike Smith saying, “oh uh” (440), was proof that he had been aware that something was wrong.

All seven crew members’ families would receive financial compensation from the government or Morton Thiokol. The wives of Ron McNair and Mike Smith and the mother of Judy Resnik filed formal charges. The remaining four spouses came to an agreement whereby they would not sue NASA.

At Thiokol, upper management responded with disdain to McDonald and Boisjoly, regarding their damning testimony as a sign of disloyalty. They were demoted from the rocket redesign, but intervention by a congressman led to both engineers being reinstated. Boisjoly experienced post-traumatic stress disorder and left the industry.

It was not until September of 1988 that a shuttle, this time the Discovery, was launched again, propelled by newly designed rocket boosters. Though changes were made within NASA—including adding astronauts to the chain of the launch decision team—some worried that the organization would eventually revert to its former ways. The shuttle program continued, launching 87 successful missions through the year 2002. The civilian in space program quietly ended.

The 28th mission of the shuttle Columbia in January 2003 proved disastrous. A piece of foam insulation covering the external fuel tank broke off as the shuttle ascended. Due to the risk of damage to the insulation tiles, NASA requested permission to use spy satellites to inspect the damage. Requests were denied, and no photos were taken. The space crew was told that there was “absolutely no concern for reentry” (446). However, no one knew that when the foam broke off, it had struck the orbiter, creating a six-inch hole in the heat shield of the left wing. The shuttle broke apart upon reentry; once again, all seven crew members perished.

The brief Epilogue notes that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board completed its findings on August 26, 2003, admitting that the lessons learned in the Challenger disaster were ultimately ignored, causing the Columbia tragedy as well. It quickly became clear that the shuttle program would never achieve its goal of making spaceflight routine and available commercially.