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Joseph McCarthyA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
McCarthy’s anti-intellectualism is evident in the way he distills the complexities of the world into the simple oppositions of good and evil. This dualistic framework extends into the social sphere, where McCarthy pits an idealized “common people” against an equally fanciful image of sinister elites and intellectuals. McCarthy offers a portrait of the intellectual as a subversive who uses his powerful connections and his knowledge of political theory to betray the nation’s interests.
McCarthy bemoans the tendency he sees in the American people to avoid conflict after years of war. For McCarthy, this is not a time for reflection but a time for action, and he is trying to rouse his audience toward a proverbial “showdown fight” (929). The Cold War is framed as a rough-and-tumble Biblical struggle, and McCarthy’s pugilistic rhetoric is ingrained with a morally righteous version of American patriotism. As he declares in the “Enemies from Within” speech, the primary distinction between Christian democracy and atheistic Communism is “not political….it is moral” (829). In McCarthy’s view of that moral conflict, one side is unambiguously right and the other unambiguously wrong. McCarthy is hostile to those who do not adhere to the stark dualism of his Cold War logic, and he considers even those in the democratic establishment to be subversive, and by extension Communist, or at least sympathetic allies of Communism. In his anti-intellectual worldview, any consideration of the complexity of global politics represents a betrayal.
In the “Enemies from Within” speech, McCarthy claims that the United States is losing the Cold War “on every front” (83) and the argument that follows is supported with a list of grievances couched in anti-intellectual tropes. When McCarthy claims that the nation has been rendered impotent by the traitorous activities of the most privileged people, who maintain the advantage of living in the “wealthiest Nation,” he is implicating the elites, those with the financial means and social connections to attend the “finest” (830) universities. Like many populist demagogues, he begins by noting a genuine social problem—in this case, that the most powerful jobs in both government and business often go to graduates of a small number of elite universities, which in turn draw their student bodies disproportionately from among the nation’s wealthiest and most powerful families. Having observed this structural inequality, he then exaggerates and simplifies until he has painted a picture of a shadowy cabal bent on preserving its own power at the expense of the “real” American people.
McCarthy describes the “bright young men” in the State Department as those “who are born with silver spoons in their mouths” (830). This depiction is infantilizing, which is important because to rhetorically infantilize one’s opponent is to drain him of masculinity. The implication is that the intellectual is also effeminate. While McCarthy denigrates the “bright young men” in the State Department, his ire is more specifically directed at Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State. McCarthy’s disparaging nickname for Acheson was the Red Dean of Fashion. Thus, the accusation of Communist affiliation, symbolized by the color red, is combined with the suggestion that Acheson is not properly masculine. In fact, he is a sort of dandy. In the last sentences of McCarthy’s speech he offers further denigration of Acheson as a “pompous diplomat in striped pants….with a phony British accent” (832). In addition to Acheson’s attire, which betrays an effeminate disposition, McCarthy suggests that he is un-American as evidenced from the feigned accent. But McCarthy’s mocking tones turn vicious in the final lines of the speech. McCarthy concludes that Acheson’s political treachery will ignite the spark of an American uprising that will “end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene” (832). Of course, the twisted and warped thinkers are the intellectuals and the subversives, terms that McCarthy uses interchangeably.
In the speech’s opening lines, McCarthy stokes audience fears about the prospect of nuclear war. The atom bomb blasts that incinerated two cities in Japan and the fact that the Soviets had recently tested would have been fresh in the American imagination in February of 1950. McCarthy draws on this collective experience, striking an almost mythic tone with the invocation of the god of war, whose “mutterings and rumblings” are palpably felt and heard (829). These grim references create a backdrop of fear against which McCarthy performs a bait-and-switch, directing audience’s fears not outward toward an external threat but rather inward toward their neighbors. McCarthy tells a story of political betrayal in which the victorious nation is sold out by Communist traitors working in the State Department itself.
The military and economic might of the United States following the World War II would have been self-evident to McCarthy’s audience. In his words, the United States was “physically the strongest nation on earth” (830), and yet he contrasts the waning of the United States on the global stage with the expansion of Soviet influence. McCarthy concludes that the reason America is losing the Cold War is not because of an external enemy but because of an internal one, capturing postwar anxieties and opportunistically turning these fears against society itself. McCarthy’s supposition that the US is at once a bastion of military power and a nation in decline owes something to the “stab-in-the-back” myth, most famously deployed in Germany after World War I to blame the country’s loss on Communists (particularly Jews) within their ranks. McCarthy applies the same conspiratorial logic to his crusade against the Communists imagined to be embedded in US government institutions. This framework offers an explanation for decline (or perceived decline) without admitting weakness.
In other words, the nation would be all-powerful if it weren’t for the traitors in the State Department. As McCarthy tells it, the enemies within betrayed US ally Chiang Kai-shek so that the Communists could win in China, surrendered to Stalin at the Yalta conference, and provide safe harbor for their fellow travelers within the government. McCarthy claims that these traitors are more pernicious than traditional spies because this Communist infiltration operates as an invisible force shaping US foreign policy. That the enemy is unseen—and could therefore be anywhere and everywhere—makes the danger more potent in McCarthy’s telling. The irony, suggested by the failure of McCarthy’s investigations to produce any convictions, is that the enemy was invisible because it never existed in the first place.
McCarthy’s depiction of the Cold War as a battle between good and evil is best understood through a consideration of the myth of American exceptionalism. This myth begins with the exceptionalist theology of the Puritans, but it’s the myth of American exceptionalism in its secularized form that dominates McCarthy’s thinking, and these ideological positions still influence American life and US foreign policy.
The myth of American exceptionalism is grounded in the religious rhetoric of the early Puritan colonists. Before the first Massachusetts Bay colonists departed from Southampton, England, John Winthrop delivered a speech in which he described the new colony as a “city upon a hill”—a phrase derived from Jesus’s sermon on the mount, implying that the new colony would be a beacon to the world and an example for other peoples to follow. The Puritan concept of American exceptionalism has been secularized over time, with the nation conceived as being guided through Enlightenment concepts such as reason and progressive rationalization rather than God. The Manichaean framework of McCarthy’s Cold War battle between Christian democracy and atheistic Communism is not dissimilar to the struggle the Puritans envisioned between good and evil.
The ideological framework of US foreign policy that strives for the democratization of the world arises from the remnants of the myth of the City on a Hill. The shift from an isolationist American exceptionalism after the First World War to an internationalist American exceptionalism in the postwar years contributed to the crisis of American identity that unfolded during the Cold War. The fear of Communism inverted into the search for the “enemies from within” is a symptom of that crisis. McCarthy perfectly encapsulates American exceptionalism and postwar destabilization in the following line: “Ours could have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction” (830). McCarthy suggests that America failed in its responsibility to be that beacon of light, and that America fell short in proving to the rest of the world that “civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself” (830). He also implies that the US was not impervious to destruction but was damaged primarily in a moral sense, raising the question of whether America can fulfill the promise of American exceptionalism.
McCarthy concretizes his apocalyptic rhetoric by offering data to support his thesis that America is in decline. He reads a list of enumerated data points in reference to the “first conference to map out the peace,” (830) by which he means the Yalta conference, as an illustration of the failures caused by Communist subversion within the government. He offers statistics to prove that the Soviet Union is expanding its power while American influence is shrinking: In the framework of American exceptionalism, these developments mean that the US is abdicating its responsibility to lead the world by example.
McCarthy laments what he perceives as American decline but portrays this decline in terms of the country’s greatness. The US is “physically the strongest nation on earth” yet the country “failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity” (830). The discrepancies in McCarthy’s bipolar depictions of America’s strength and/or weakness seem to indicate that his thought is still informed by the previous form of isolationist American exceptionalism. It is noteworthy that the officials he deems most traitorous are those who drive foreign policy, which in the postwar years was characterized by an activist internationalism and the desire to spread democracy abroad. McCarthy’s fixation on the enemy within would then suggest a conflict between two forms of American exceptionalism, the isolationist and the internationalist. The question is whether he is suspicious of their internationalism or whether he thinks the internationalists are not activist enough.
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