The First Treatise of Government

“God gave him not private dominion over the inferior creatures, but right in common with all mankind.”

Adam, according to Filmer, enjoyed private dominion over the world, which means that God gave the world to Adam as a kind of private property. Locke insists, however, that Scripture, including the passages Filmer employs, actually proves that God gave the world to “all mankind” in common, which supports Locke’s arguments for natural freedom and equality.

“If it be said, the Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was not so subjected to him, as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or property in them: for shall we say that God ever made a joint grant to two, and only one was to have the benefit of it?”

As in the previous quotation, Locke here rejects Filmer’s assertion that God gave Adam dominion over the world. Locke builds on his arguments for natural freedom and against the divine-right of fatherly authority by bringing Eve into the story. In the Book of Genesis, “God blessed them, and said unto them, Have dominion” (32). God made his grant, therefore, to both Adam and Eve, which must have made her “lady” as much as he was “lord” of all the Earth (33). This marks the first of several places in the text where Locke uses Eve, or mothers in general, to counter Filmer’s argument for fatherhood as the source of monarchical authority.

“I defy any man to make a more pleasant conclusion than this, which cannot be excused from the most obvious absurdity, till it can be shewn, that by children of men, he who had no father, Adam alone is signified; but whatever our author does, the Scripture speaks not nonsense.”

In a general sense, and in the way Locke uses it here, the phrase “pleasant conclusion” is a sarcastic description of a conclusion derived from evidence that cannot possibly support it. In this case, according to Locke, Filmer twists the Biblical phrase “children of men” to mean “Adam alone,” which makes the phrase convenient to Filmer’s argument (and therefore “pleasant”) for divine-right monarchy based on fatherhood.

“I grant, it is not probable, that Adam’s private dominion was here abrogated: because it is more than improbable, (for it will never be proved) that ever Adam had any such private dominion: and since parallel places of Scripture are most probable to make us know how they may be best understood, there needs but the comparing this blessing here to Noah and his sons after the flood, with that to Adam after the creation, i. Gen. 28. to assure anyone that God gave Adam no such private dominion.”

This is a unique quotation, for it not only advances Locke’s argument against divine-right monarchy descended from Adam’s fatherhood, it also explains the general method by which Locke interprets Biblical passages. He refers to “parallel places of Scripture,” which reveal “how they may be best understood.” This means that in order to comprehend a particular passage in a text, one must analyze it in the context of other passages in the same text. The more one analyzes texts in this manner, the closer one gets to an author’s meaning. In this specific instance, Locke uses God’s blessing to Noah and his three sons as evidence that one should not read God’s grant to Adam as a gift of private dominion that conferred absolute monarchy.

“But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may starve him if he please.”

Here Locke introduces another Biblical injunction against Filmer’s absolute monarchy, for no man has the power to deprive another of his rightful share in the Earth’s bounty. In this same paragraph, Locke notes that a man who has “plenty” does not thereby have a divine right to absolute authority, for “God requires him to afford” charity to relieve “the wants of his brother” (48).

“God, in this text, gives not, that I see, any authority to Adam over Eve, or to men over their wives, but only foretels what should be the woman’s lot, how by providence he would order it so, that she should be subject to her husband, as we see that generally the laws of mankind and customs of nations have ordered it so, and there is, I grant, a foundation in nature for it.”

This is another unique quotation, for it shows Locke not only dismissing the idea of Adam’s monarchical power but also wrestling with the meaning of Eve’s apparent subjection. Locke concludes that the Bible gives no authority to Adam nor to husbands in general but instead “only foretels” that a wife “should be subject to her husband.” How can a wife be subject to a husband who has no authority over her? Locke refers to a passage in the Book of Genesis where God says to woman: “[I]n sorrow thou shalt bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee” (53). In the context of pregnancy and childbirth, a wife is “subject” to her husband only in the sense that she is dependent on him. At all times, too, she might depend on him for physical protection. This most likely is what Locke means by “a foundation in nature” for a wife’s subjection. God made pregnancy and vulnerability part of her condition, which imparts to a husband only responsibility, not authority.

“Sir Robert has too much lessened a subject’s authority to leave himself the hopes of establishing any thing by his bare saying it; one slave’s opinion without proof is not of weight enough to dispose of the liberty and fortunes of all mankind.”

Here Locke refers both to Filmer’s habit of making unproven assertions and to the logical consequences of Filmer’s argument for divine-right monarchy. In this specific case, Filmer insists, without proof, that merely begetting (conceiving) a child confers absolute authority upon the father. From this Locke produces a more general indictment of Filmer’s divine-right argument: If God vested absolute monarchical authority in Adam and Adam’s heirs, and if this is the only legitimate authority anywhere in the world, as Filmer claims, then all other men are slaves whose opinions are entitled to no consideration. Ironically, this would include Filmer himself, whose argument for divine-right monarchy might then be as easily dismissed as all others.

“This would give the father but joint dominion with the mother over them.”

Here Locke again refers to Filmer’s argument that begetting a child gives fathers absolute authority. The act of conception, Locke notes, requires two people. Conception alone, therefore, supports parental equality, not fatherly dominion.

“If therefore this command, Honour thy father and mother, concern political dominion, it directly overthrows our author’s monarchy.”

When citing the Decalogue as proof of fatherly dominion, Filmer goes so far as to exclude the phrase “and mother” from the commandment to “[h]onor thy father and mother” when referencing it. Since Filmer equates monarchical authority with fatherly authority, the phrase “and mother” amounts to such a powerful refutation that Filmer has no choice but to exclude it. The phrase “and mother,” according to Locke, “directly overthrows our author’s monarchy.”

“[I]f all this be so, as I think, by what has been said, is very evident; then man has a natural freedom, notwithstanding all our author confidently says to the contrary.”

By “all this,” Locke means the Biblical commandment to honor both father and mother. Whereas Filmer excludes “and mother” so as to bolster his case for a divine-right monarchy based on the principle of fatherhood, Locke views the inclusion of “and mother” as proof of parental equality, which is consistent not with absolute monarchy but with natural freedom.

“Here then are two absolute unlimited powers existing together, which I would have anybody reconcile to one another, or to common sense.”

By equating fatherly authority with monarchical authority, Filmer invests fathers with the powers of kings. Locke notes, however, that when a father’s son becomes a father himself, there are now two fathers, in which case there are two absolute monarchs simultaneously—an impossibility even under Filmer’s conception of divine right.

“If then the private dominion of Adam, i.e. his property in the creatures, descended at his death all entirely to his eldest son, his heir; (for, if it did not, there is presently an end of all Sir Robert’s monarchy) and his natural dominion, the dominion a father has over his children by begetting them, belonged immediately, upon Adam’s decease, equally to all his sons who had children, by the same title their father had it, the sovereignty founded upon property, and the sovereignty founded upon fatherhood, come to be divided.”

Divine-right monarchy involves the problem of inheritance. Upon the absolute monarch’s death, who succeeds to the throne? If titles descend like property, in this case to the eldest son, then only one heir can ever lay claim to the throne. Filmer, however, also bases the divine right of kings on fatherhood, which cannot descend to the eldest son, who, after all, might or might not be a father. Furthermore, even if the eldest son has children of his own, younger sons also might be fathers, in which case they too would inherit fatherly dominion. Locke concludes, therefore, that neither property nor fatherhood constitutes a sound basis for political authority.

“To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.”

Locke describes one of the central problems with Filmer’s divine-right doctrine. If God made Adam absolute monarch of the world, and if Adam’s title descended in full to his posterity, then it is not enough to proclaim that such a power exists—it is also essential to identify Adam’s one true heir. After all, absolute power, by its nature, is indivisible. This passage signals the beginning of Locke’s search for the one true heir as he follows Filmer through the pages of the Old Testament.

“But government being for the benefit of the governed, and not the sole advantage of the governors; (but only for their’s with the rest, as they make a part of that politic body, each of whose parts and members are taken care of, and directed in its peculiar functions by the good of the whole, by the laws of society), cannot be inherited by the same title, that children have to the goods of their father.”

Continuing to examine the problem of inheritance, Locke argues that political authority, notwithstanding Filmer’s assertions, cannot descend to heirs in the same manner as property. Children have a claim on their parents’ property only because parents, by bringing a child into the world, agree to meet the child’s needs. Otherwise, property exists wholly for its owner’s use. Government, on the other hand, exists for the good of all. This is an argument for government by consent of the governed based on natural freedom and equality.

“[I]f the agreement and consent of men first gave a scepter into anyone’s hand, or put a crown on his head, that also must direct its descent and conveyance; for the same authority that made the first a lawful ruler, must make the second too, and so give the right of succession.”

While much of First Treatise reads like timeless political philosophy with universal application, this passage reminds the reader of Locke’s purpose as stated in the book’s preface: to justify the claim of King William III to the English throne. Here Locke implies (though he does not name the individuals in question) that Parliament had a right to depose the exiled King James II (“the same authority that made the first”), who tried to rule by divine right but in fact ruled only by consent, and by the same reasoning, Parliament had a right to crown King William III (“must make the second too”) and determine his “succession.”

“Adam therefore, as has been proved, being neither monarch, nor his imaginary monarchy hereditable, the power which is now in the world, is not that which was Adam’s, since all that Adam could have upon our author’s grounds, either of property or fatherhood, necessarily died with him, and could not be conveyed to posterity by inheritance.”

This passage appears in the final paragraph of Chapter 9, wherein Locke argues that Adam’s absolute monarchy, had it existed, could not have been passed on to his descendants either as property or by the principle of fatherhood. While this passage represents a concise summary of Locke’s case against the divine-right doctrine, it also features the phrase “the power which is now in the world”—a reminder that Locke is not only answering Filmer but building his own argument for natural freedom and government-by-consent.

“This designation of the person our author is more than ordinary obliged to take care of, because he, affirming that the assignment of civil power is by divine institution, hath made the conveyance as well as the power itself sacred.”

In Chapter 11, Locke examines in substantial detail Filmer’s attempt to trace the divine right of kings through Scripture. This passage identifies Locke’s primary criticism of Filmer’s futile effort: To establish a monarchical succession from Adam, Filmer not only must demonstrate that the divine right of kings existed at all times but that God transferred this right from heir to heir. This, of course, Filmer cannot do.

“A notable limitation, a limitation to all mankind: for if our author can find any one amongst mankind, that is not of the line and posterity of Adam, he may perhaps tell him, who this next heir of Adam is: but for us, I despair how this limitation of Adam’s empire to his line and posterity will help us to find out one heir.”

Here Locke highlights the impossible absurdity of trying to identify Adam’s one true heir. Filmer’s “limitation” of absolute power to “the individual person and line of Adam,” which Filmer calls one of the “ordinances of God,” in fact means that anyone on Earth could inherit Adam’s title (127). It is clear that Filmer, in his defense of divine-right monarchy, meant only to establish the power itself, which is one reason why Locke devotes so much space to the question of how this power might have been conveyed from heir to heir and who in the modern world might wield it.

“I go on then to ask, whether in the inheriting of this paternal power, this supreme fatherhood, the grandson by a daughter hath a right before a nephew by a brother? Whether the grandson by the eldest son, being an infant, before the younger son, a man and able? Whether the daughter before the uncle? or any other man, descended by a male line? Whether a grandson by a younger daughter, before a grand-daughter by an elder daughter? Whether the elder son by a concubine, before a younger son by a wife? From whence also will arise many questions of legitimation, and what in nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a concubine? for as to the municipal or positive laws of men, they can signify nothing here.”

The key phrases in this sequence of succession-related hypotheticals are “municipal or positive laws of men” and “signify nothing.” According to Filmer, Adam and his heirs ruled by divine right. Locke observes that if this is true, then both the investiture of power and its conveyance occurred by God’s will. Filmer insists that God created absolute monarchy and sanctified it with the principle of fatherhood. In that case, according to Locke, the “positive laws of men” are meaningless, so it will be impossible to distinguish between potential claimants to the throne provided they all descend from the male line. Furthermore, if fatherhood confers monarchical authority, and if the conveyance of this authority occurs only by divine will, then how can the “positive laws of men” give preference to the son by a wife over the son by a concubine? Here Locke demonstrates that the doctrine of conveyance-by-divine-right actually undermines stable governments.

“And thus this doctrine cuts up all government by the roots.”

This is the most succinct statement of Locke’s belief that the divine-right doctrine leads to chaos. Divine-right monarchy “leaves no room for human prudence, or consent,” and yet divine-right advocates such as Filmer, according to his own criteria, cannot identify a rightful ruler, in which case all government is illegitimate (146).

“If Noah did divide the world between his sons, and his assignment of dominion to them were good, there is an end of divine institution.”

Continuing with the theme of conveyance from one heir to another, Locke cites the Biblical passage in which Noah, after the Flood, divides the world between his three sons. If Noah had the authority to do this, then God, contrary to Filmer’s claims, does not convey absolute power from heir to heir, in which case the divine-right doctrine cannot hold. Locke also has noted elsewhere that the conveyance from Noah to all three of his sons equally puts an end to the idea of one absolute sovereign.

“I fear the Chineses, a very great and civil people, as well as several other people of the East, West, North and South, trouble not themselves much about this matter.”

The “matter” in question is Filmer’s assertion that the “civilest nations of the earth” attempt to trace their ancestry to Noah’s male line. Locke replies that the “great and civil” Chinese and many other people in fact make no such attempt.

“If our author has no better foundation for his monarchy than a supposition of what was done at the dispersion of Babel, the monarchy he erects thereon, whose top is to reach to heaven to unite mankind, will serve only to divide and scatter them as that tower did; and, instead of establishing civil government and order in the world, will produce nothing but confusion.”

Filmer argues that the “dispersion of Babel”—the Biblical story of the spreading of nations across the world and the proliferation of languages—reveals “the establishment of royal power” (164). Locke notes that this is impossible by Filmer’s own reckoning, for Filmer insists that God established absolute royal power in Adam and that this power descended in full through Adam’s heirs. Either way, the key phrase here is “nothing but confusion,” for it supports Locke’s broader argument that divine-right monarchy brings chaos instead of stability.